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Federal Court Cases
Summaries:
Full text versions:
US
v. MARTINEZ-FUERTE
This is another border-related case that incrementally
increases law enforcement's ability to avoid Fourth Amendment restrictions.
The court permits the use of roadblocks several miles inland from
national borders under the following rationale: There aren't feasible
alternatives (in their opinion). It is a known and ongoing roadblock
so travelers can avoid it if they want to. And, supposedly motorist
fear and surprise is minimal because this is an established roadblock
with clear evidence of enforcement authority. These themes will be
repeated in subsequent cases as if they are supported by scientific
findings, rather than the off-hand personal opinions of court justices,
of which they are. GO
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US
v. HUGUENIN AND MARTIN
Defendants-appellants Judith A. Huguenin and William A.
Martin appeal the denial of their joint motion to suppress evidence
obtained after a search and seizure at an automobile checkpoint. Following
their conditional pleas of guilty for possession with intent to distribute
marijuana, defendants challenged the constitutionality of police procedures
used to stop motorists exiting off a Tennessee highway upon warning
that motorists are approaching a narcotics/DUI checkpoint. Because
we conclude that the procedures used by law enforcement officers were
unconstitutional, we REVERSE the denial of the defendants' motion
to suppress. GO
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DELAWARE
v. PROUSE 1979
This is the case that pulls together the two themes that
have merged in the dispute over when it is permissible to stop motorists
without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. The court re-affirmed
that individual officers cannot randomly stop motorists, just because
they don't have anything better to do with their time. They must have
at least reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle and question the driver.
However, the court volunteered that all the issues that made such
random stops "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment could
be remedied by setting up formal roadblocks. This was a loud and clear
signal from the court that roadblocks were OK as long as they were
organized and systematic in their administration and implementation.
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TERRY
v. OHIO 1968
This case established three important precedents: Stopping
a person through the use of police authority, even though an arrest
is not commenced, is a "seizure" for Fourth Amendment purposes.
"Patting down" a suspect in search of arms is a "search"
for Fourth Amendment purposes. However, this is the case that determined
search and seizure are permissible WITHOUT probable cause. A lesser
standard, "reasonable suspicion" will heretofore be considered
sufficient to permit search and seizure. This is a clear departure
from the standard that defined the term "reasonable" as
it related to the Fourth Amendment. "Unreasonable" searches
and seizures were events that could not be supported by probable cause
standards and were therefore unconstitutional. Allowing search and
seizure without probable cause was a major emasculation of the Fourth
Amendment that has led to the continual erosion of privacy rights.
GO
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EDMOND
AND PALMER v. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS
To summarize, we have identified four exceptions to the principle that
a search or seizure is forbidden by the Fourth Amendment unless there
is a basis for believing that a particular search or seizure, as distinct
from a program of universal or randomized searches or seizures, will
yield evidence or fruits or instrumentalities of crime. The first exception,
illustrated by the roadblock set up to catch a fleeing criminal, is
where there is a suspect--the police have identified the criminal and
have only to find him--but it is infeasible to avoid an indiscriminate
search or seizure of other persons, persons not suspected of crime,
as well. The second exception, illustrated by the hypothetical dynamite
case, is where no specific person is under suspicion but the circumstances
make it impossible to prevent a crime without an indiscriminate search.
The third exception is the regulatory search, the objective of which
is to protect a specific activity rather than to operate as an adjunct
to general criminal law enforcement. The last exception is the prevention
of illegal importation whether of persons (a power limited to the federal
government, Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999)) or of goods. On
the basis of the record compiled in the preliminary-injunction proceedings--a
record essentially limited to the parties' stipulation of facts--the
Indianapolis roadblock program has not been shown to fit any of these
exceptions, and thus the lawfulness of the program has not, as the district
judge believed, been established. As that was the only ground on which
she denied the preliminary injunction, her order cannot stand. GO
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GALBERTH
and TAYLOR v. U.S.
In these consolidated appeals appellants Russell Galberth and Jay Taylor
appeal their convictions on the ground that the trial court erred in
denying their motions to suppress evidence that was discovered after
they were stopped at police traffic roadblocks. Guided by Supreme Court
precedent, we balance the government interest served by the roadblocks
against the liberty interest of the individuals seized. We therefore
conclude that appellant Galberth's conviction must be reversed, given
Judge Dixon's finding that the roadblock at which Galberth was stopped
was designed to combat violence and illegal drug activity. We further
conclude that Judge Huhn's finding do not clearly indicate the principal
purpose of the road block at which appellant Taylor was stopped. We
therefore remand for further findings in appellant Taylor's case. GO
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US
v. BRIGNONI-PONCE 1975
This case confirms that roving patrols cannot randomly
stop and check vehicles, unless they have "reasonable suspicion"
that the vehicles are carrying smuggled goods or illegal aliens. GO
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ALMEIDA-SANCHEZ
v. US
Petitioner, a Mexican citizen and holder of a valid
work permit, challenges the constitutionality of the Border Patrol's
warrantless search of his automobile 25 air miles north of the Mexican
border. The search, made without probable cause or consent, uncovered
marihuana, which was used to convict petitioner of a federal crime.
The Government seeks to justify the search on the basis of 287 (a)
(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which provides for warrantless
searches of automobiles and other conveyances "within a reasonable
distance from any external boundary of the United States," as authorized
by regulations to be promulgated by the Attorney General. The Attorney
General's regulation defines "reasonable distance" as "within 100
air miles from any external boundary of the United States." The Court
of Appeals upheld the search on the basis of the Act and regulation.
The US Supreme Court reversed the Appeals Court decision and declared
that the warrantless search of petitioner's automobile, made without
probable cause or consent, violated the Fourth Amendment. GO
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CAMARA
v. MUNICIPLE COURT
Appellant was charged with violating the San Francisco
Housing Code for refusing, after three efforts by city housing inspectors
to secure his consent, to allow a warrantless inspection of the ground-floor
quarters which he leased and residential use of which allegedly violated
the apartment building's occupancy permit. Claiming the inspection
ordinance unconstitutional for failure to require a warrant for inspections,
appellant while awaiting trial sued in a State Superior Court for
a writ of prohibition, which the court denied. Relying on Frank v.
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, and similar cases, the District Court of Appeal
affirmed, holding that the ordinance did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
The State Supreme Court denied a petition for hearing. GO
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US
v. ORTIZ
The Fourth Amendment held to forbid Border Patrol officers,
in the absence of consent or probable cause, to search private vehicles
at traffic checkpoints removed from the border and its functional
equivalents, and for this purpose there is no difference between a
checkpoint and a roving patrol. GO
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BROWN
v. TEXAS
Two police officers, while cruising near noon in a patrol
car, observed appellant and another man walking away from one another
in an alley in an area with a high incidence of drug traffic. They
stopped and asked appellant to identify himself and explain what he
was doing. One officer testified that he stopped appellant because
the situation "looked suspicious, and we had never seen that subject
in that area before." The officers did not claim to suspect appellant
of any specific misconduct, nor did they have any reason to believe
that he was armed. When appellant refused to identify himself, he
was arrested for violation of a Texas statute which makes it a criminal
act for a person to refuse to give his name and address to an officer
"who has lawfully stopped him and requested the information." Appellant's
motion to set aside an information charging him with violation of
the statute on the ground that the statute violated the First, Fourth,
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments was denied, and he was convicted
and fined. GO
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MICHIGAN
v. SITZ
This is the culmination of three decades of cases that lead
to the disintegration of the Fourth Amendment as it applies to motorists,
or anyone on public thoroughfares or areas deemed open to the public.
By bringing all the pieces together the court fashioned a decision
based on half-truths, suppositions, baseless opinions and a determined
effort to introduce the use of roadblocks as a standard means of controlling
human behavior in the United States. The court left little doubt that
it understood that the inherent value of roadblocks is to instill
fear and intimidation in the minds of citizens who use the public
roadways. There was barely a pretence that roadblocks would "catch"
large numbers of drunk drivers. Here the court repeated its previous
findings; roadblocks are a "minor inconvenience," they create
minimal fear and apprehension, abusive discretion in minimized by
requiring administrative oversight, and by balancing the "benefits"
that derive from roadblocks against the infringement of individual
rights the state gains more than the individual loses. The high profile
"drunk driving problem" was the ideal venue to exercise
this decision. GO
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